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NOTES
WITH HISTORY, ALL THINGS ARE
SECULAR:
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND
THE USE OF HISTORY
.NTRODUCTION
In 1998, the Ohio chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union
and a Presbyterian minister brought action to enjoin the State of Ohio
from recognizing "With God, All Things Are Possible" as the state
motto.1 The district court denied the request for injunctive relief and
found that the motto did not violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals scheduled the case for an en banc
hearing.3 The en banc panel affirmed, in part, the district court's de-
cision and found the motto constitutional.4 The Supreme Court of the
United States may be the next stop for this enigmatic case.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has developed into a confus-
ing state of affairs, resulting in inconsistent, unpredictable, and highly
subjective lower court decisions. Because the Supreme Court has not
designated a single, workable standard for Establishment Clause ad-
judication, courts have employed various standards, including an ap-
proach based on history, to justify decisions.
1 ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1177 (S.D. Ohio
1998).
2 Seeid. at1185.
3 ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing
trial court).
4 ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
5 See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (using a historical approach to
establishment clause jurisprudence).
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The Supreme Court has been criticized for this turn to history.6
Scholars have suggested that the use of general history is "fundamen-
tally flawed" and intellectually dishonest.7 Because the Court has
neither articulated a framework to analyze Establishment Clause chal-
lenges, nor issued any guidelines involving the use of history, the fu-
ture of Establishment Clause jurisprudence appears problematic.
The purpose of this Note is examine the use of history as a prin-
ciple of adjudication in Establishment Clause cases, and how the dis-
trict court decision in American Civil Liberties Union v. Capital
Square Review and Advisory Board8 exemplifies problems with two
specific applications of history. Part I constructs a brief overview of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Part II introduces the Court's
use of history as a basis for decision-making, and defines two distinct
historical approaches used by the Court, and problems associated with
each approach. Part fII proposes less problematic methods of incor-
porating history into Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
In order to evaluate the use of history in Establishment Clause
cases, one must understand the state of Establishment Clause juris-
prudence. The Supreme Court has taken various approaches in ana-
lyzing Establishment Clause cases. The Court has not formally
adopted a historical a~proach, but their opinions continue to rely on
history and tradition. The following summary of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence establishes a framework within which to ana-
lyze the influences of history on Establishment Clause decision-
making.
6 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First
Amendment, 44 HASTINGs LJ. 901, 901 (1993) ("What has been done in the past cannot answer
normatively what the law should be in the future."); Daniel L. Dreisbach, Review Essay: A
Lively and Fair Experiment: Religion and the American Constitutional Tradition, 49 EMORY
L.J. 223, 232 (2000) (describing the critics' charge that the Court's use of history promulgates a
flawed, "simplistic and largely fictionalized version of American history") (quoting Robert L.
Cord, Understanding the First Amendment, NAT'L REV., Jan. 22, 1982, at 26,28).
7 See Dreisbach, supra note 6, at 232 ("By superficial and purposive interpretations of
the past, the Court has dishonored the arts of the historian and degraded the talents of the law-
yer.") (quoting MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTrrIUTIONAL HISTORY 4 (1965)).
1 20F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
9 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding a government sponsored
holiday religious display using an ad hoc approach based on tradition).
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A. The Development of a Standard
The foundation for modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence
was built in 1947 with Everson v. Board of Education.0 In Everson,
the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey law permitting reimburse-
ment of transportation costs for parents who send their children to
private religious schools. The Everson Court stated the lengthy, and
commonly cited, purpose of the Establishment Clause, adopting
Thomas Jefferson's separationist concept of the First Amendment as a
"wall between church and state."'" The Court found no constitutional
violation because the state had a legitimate secular purpose of pro-
moting safety for children. 2
Everson also left its mark on Establishment Clause jurisprudence
by extending Establishment Clause jurisprudence to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.13 While Everson is an early and impor-
tant Establishment Clause case, critics suggested the wall theory was
unworkable because literal separation of church and state was impos-
sible. 1
4
The Court substantially expanded on its interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause several years later in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp.15 In Schempp, the Court held that prayer in a
Pennsylvania school violated the Establishment Clause. 16  The
Schempp Court attempted to reconcile the Free Exercise Clause of the
10 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
" The Everson Court noted:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or pro-
fessing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or what-
ever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between church and State."
Il at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
12 See id. at 17 (considering the "school children's welfare").
13 See Dreisbach, supra note 6, at 224 (explaining the holding of Everson).
14 See Lisa Langendorfer, Comment, Establishing a Pattern: An Analysis of the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 33 U. RICH L. REV. 705, 707 (1999) ("These
decisions lacked uniformity because different justices interpreting 'the wall' had no single
framework under which to operate.").
15 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
16 Id. at 223 (holding the challenged practices "are in violation of the Establishment
Clause").
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First Amendment with the Establishment Clause by introducing a
two-pronged test, which replaced the wall metaphor. 17  The first
prong required that the statute in question have a secular purpose (the
"purpose prong"), while the second prong mandated that the primary
effect of the statute neither inhibit nor advance one particular religion
(the "effect prong").18
In 1970, the Supreme Court expanded on the Schempp test by
adding a third prong. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,19 the Court dealt with
state funding for church-related schools and school faculties.20 Chief
Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion, stated that in addition to
the purpose and effect prongs, a statute could not "foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion., 21  With the third prong
added, the three-part test was complete, and the famous Lemon test
was born.
B. Post-Lemon Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Courts have applied the Lemon test regularly, and the test still
exists today, as it has not been expressly abandoned. However, the
Supreme Court has voiced concerns about the test, and consequently
courts have not applied Lemon consistently. 23 Furthermore, many
courts have expressly criticized Lemon and its progeny.2 4
In Lynch v. Donnelly,2 5 the Court upheld a city-sponsored
Christmas display. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor revised
the first two prongs (purpose and effect) of the Lemon test by creating
the Endorsement test, which has been used by numerous courts.2 6
The Endorsement test modifies Lemon by focusing on whether the
objective observer2 7 would consider the government practice an en-
1, Id. at 222. See also Langendorfer, supra note 14, at 705 (explaining the rejection of the
wall approach).
I8 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (discussing the two-pronged approach).
9 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2o See id. at 620 ("The Pennsylvania statute also provides state aid to church-related
schools for teachers' salaries.").
21 Id. at 612-613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,674 (1970)).22 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (applying the Lemon test).
23 See ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio
1998) (holding that the Ohio motto fell under an "exception" to the Lemon test).
24 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (using an ad hoc approach to evaluate the
Establishment Clause challenge); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (suggesting that
the Lemon test prongs "are no more than helpful signposts").
2s 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
26 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (applying the Endorse-
ment test).
27 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing
the objective, reasonable observer standard).
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dorsement of religion, instead of whether thegovernment practice had
the effect of inhibiting or advancing religion.2
The Court applied Justice O'Connor's Endorsement test in
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.29  In Alle-
gheny, the Court held that a nativity scene displayed inside a county
courthouse violated the Establishment Clause.30 The Court stated that
the Endorsement test "provides a sound analytical framework for
evaluating governmental use of religious symbols. 31
The Court has also applied a combination of the Lemon test and
the Endorsement test. In Wallace v. Jaffree,32 the Supreme Court
struck down an Alabama statute that provided for a moment of silence
for prayer in school. The majority opinion modified the purpose
prong of Lemon by asking whether the "government's actual purpose
is to endorse or disapprove of religion., 33 In a dissenting opinion in
Wallace, then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Lemon test be
abandoned entirely.34 Rehnquist argued that the Lemon test sent the
Court into a frenzy of "unworkable plurality opinions. 35 Further-
more, Rehnquist argued that original intent is the guiding principle in
Establishment Clause cases, and Lemon runs afoul of this.36
Wallace was not the first case to suggest modifications or aban-
donment of the Lemon test. Over the years, the Supreme Court jus-
tices have continually proposed modifications to Lemon, as well as
new tests altogether. Justice Souter supports an Endorsement test, but
has suggested that the test would require complete neutrality.37 In
Board of Education v. Grumet,38 the Supreme Court rejected a statute
that made the incorporated Village of Kiryas Joel, in the city of Mon-
roe, New York, its own separate school district. The Court found that
the separate school district was established for the impermissible rea-
son of aiding a particular religious community.
28 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 ("Focusing on institutional entanglement and on endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device.").
29 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
'o See id. at 621.
31 Id. at 595.
32 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
33 Id. at 56 ('In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion."') (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668,690 (1984)).
3 See id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 110.
36 Id. at 113 ("Any deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of that Char-
ter and will only lead to the type of unprincipled decisionmaking that has plagued our Estab-
lishment Clause cases since Everson.").
37 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,627 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
38 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
39 See id. (holding the school district was created to separate Satmars, a sect of Hasidic
Jews, from non-Satmars, and therefore aids one particular religious community).
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Justice Souter, writing for the majority opinion, stated that "[t]he
fundamental source of constitutional concern here is that the legisla-
ture itself may fail to exercise governmental authority in a religiously
neutral way."'4 The Grumet holding sought to police government
practices more strictly than the Endorsement test because it required
complete neutrality, not merely an absence of government endorse-
ment of religion.4'
In contrast to Justice Souter's approach, Justice Kennedy has
suggested a coercion test.42 This test mandates that the government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise. Kennedy includes peer pressure or other forms of indirect
coercion in his definition of coercion. 43 This test is distinct from the
Endorsement tests of either O'Connor or Souter, because it allows
government involvement in religion so long as individuals are not
coerced into religious participation. Kennedy's approach would make
it possible for more Establishment Clause challenges to pass constitu-
tional muster.
Justice Scalia takes the Kennedy approach one step further by
defining coercion narrowly. 44 Scalia is concerned with a more direct
form of coercion than Kennedy, as Scalia defines coercion as that "of
religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and
threat of penalty.'45 Scalia also urges the Court to adopt a historical
approach to Establishment Clause cases, including a more deferential
attitude toward the framers' intent.46
All of the approaches to the Establishment Clause have created
confusion, which the Court's most recent case did not clarify. In
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,47 the Court struck down
the school's practice of allowing a student-led prayer to be delivered
48before high school football games. During the original lawsuit, the
40 Id. at 703.
41 See id. at 703.
42 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
and dissenting).
43 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) ("The undeniable fact is that the school
district's supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure,
as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respect-
ful silence during the invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can
be as real as any overt compulsion.").
44 See id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I see no warrant for expanding the concept of
coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty ... .
41 Id. at 640.
46 See id. at 632 (discussing history and original intent).
47 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
48 See id. at 317 (concluding that the practice "is invalid on its face because it establishes
an improper majoritarian election on religion, and unquestionably has the purpose and creates
the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important school events").
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school district adopted an alternative policy of having students vote
on whether an "invocation" before football games should be allowed,
and if allowed, who would deliver the prayer.49 This alternative prac-
tice still failed to pass constitutional scrutiny. 0
Most federal courts have applied the Lemon test, or a derivation
thereof, to Establishment Clause challenges, 51 although many of these
courts have acknowledged the confusing state of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. In light of this confusion, many courts have
used other approaches, including a turn to history.
II. THE USE OF HISTORY IN ESTABLISHMENT CASES
The use of history as an adjudicative technique has been com-
mented on extensively.52 Most critics that suggest the Court has
turned to history have evaluated the influence of general history on
decision-making.53 This Note divides the use of history into specific
approaches, and focuses on two approaches courts have employed as
a means of weaving history into Establishment Clause cases. The
first approach relies on tradition, or a continuous religious practice, to
establish constitutionality. The second approach relies on constitu-
tional activities, practices, and symbols that have become part of the
"fabric of society." 54 Under this theory, the cultural or traditional
value of a specific religious practice may allow the Court to treat the
practice as secular or non-religious. The Capital Square district court
opinion illustrates an application of these two approaches. In addi-
tion, Capital Square highlights ambiguities in both approaches and
the issues lower courts are forced to confront as a result.
In order to organize a historical analysis, it is helpful to make
some important distinctions involving the use of history. First of all,
history may be internal to the law or external to the law.55 Internal
history is precedent or other relevant legal history.56 By contrast, ex-
ternal history deals with non-procedural history such as originalism,
41 See id. at 296-97.
so Id. at 317 ("Simply by establishing this school-related procedure, which entrusts the
inherently nongovernmental subject of religion to a majoritarian vote, a constitutional violation
has occurred. No further inquiry is required for the policy to fail a facial challenge.").
5' See ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio
1998) (holding the Ohio motto does not violate Lemon or any modification of Lemon).
52 See, e.g., CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY
(1969); Chemerinsky, supra note 6; Dreisbach, supra note 6.
53 See Dreisbach, supra note 6, at 226 ("Given the Supreme Court's extensive and con-
tinuing reliance on general history to inform its church-state pronouncements, historical analysis
has become a prominent feature of church-state jurisprudence and discourse.").
5 See Capital Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
55 See MILLER, supra note 53, at 21 (defining internal and external history).
56 See id. at 21 (suggesting internal history pertains to legal history, which consist of "the
history of legal terms and doctrine, legal systems, and judicial practices").
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tradition, and cultural history. Originalism is a strict judicial con-
struct, which mandates that constitutional decisions be consistent with
the text of the constitution or intent of the framers of the constitu-
tion.57 Similarly, courts may rely on the intent of a legislature to de-
termine the constitutionality of a statute.
Although highly relevant to a discussion about the use of history,
both originalism and legislative intent have been dealt with exhaus-
tively by courts and legal commentators.58 Therefore, it is essential,
as this Note establishes, to explore other ways history has been ap-
plied in Establishment Clause cases.
A. Tradition: The Unbroken Practice Justification
The first approach to using history as an adjudicative technique
is the tradition or unbroken practice justification. The underlying
logic of this approach is that a government-sponsored religious prac-
tice is justified because it has existed for a continuing period of time,
and has traditionally not been found to violate the constitution.59
Tradition has been invoked by the Supreme Court several times
with respect to various areas of the law.6° Erwin Chemerinsky has
commented thoroughly on the use of history, specifically the use of
tradition in judicial decision-making. 61 Chemerinsky has defined tra-
dition as a denial of "constitutional protection by holding that the
claimed right was not historically protected." 62 Chemerinsky cites
various Supreme Court decisions that have relied on tradition.63 Ex-
amples include Bowers v. Hardwick,64 which justifies its "conclusion
largely on the traditional prohibition of... [homosexual] conduct," 65
57 See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 909-10 (defining originalism).
58 See generally Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980) (examining the use of originalism as a means of constitutional inter-
pretation); David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's Fidel-
ity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY LJ. 1377 (1999) (discussing originalism and
legislative intent).
59 See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 901 (defining tradition).
60 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) ("There is an unbroken history of
official acknowledgement by all three branches of government of the role of religion in Ameri-
can life."); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (using tradition to partially justify uphold-
ing prayer before Nebraska legislative sessions).
61 See Chemirinsky, supra note 6, at 901 ("In virtually every area of constitutional law,
the Supreme Court increasingly is relying on tradition as its guide in decisionmaking.").
62 Id. at 901 (introducing the concept of tradition as a decision-making tool).
63 Id. at 903 ("I have had the impression that more decisions are based on conclusions
about historical practices. My impression was confirmed by Professor Rebecca Brown, who
found that in 1990 and 1991, 83 majority opinions invoked tradition, compared to only 216 uses
of tradition in majority opinions in the decade between 1980 and 1990.").
64 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
65 Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 904.
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and Roth v. United States,66 in which the court undertook a historical
analysis to conclude that "the First Amendment does not protect ob-
scenity.
67
A famous example of a court using tradition is found in a case
involving constitutional analysis of executive power. In Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer,68 the Court was faced with decid-
ing whether President Truman "was acting within his constitutional
power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce
to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel mills. 69
The Court held that the President did not have such power, and Jus-
tice Frankfurter wrote a compelling concurrence that stated that ab-
sent legislative action to the contrary, "a systematic, unbroken, execu-
tive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never
before questioned... may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power'
vested in the President., 70  Frankfirter's concurrence related to a
separation of power issue, but the logic transfers easily to the realm of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
,Tradition has played a significant role in Establishment Clause
cases. 71 In American Civil Liberties Union v. Capital Square Review
& Advisory Board,72 the District Court partially relied on a tradition
theory. Citing Marsh v. Chambers,3 the Court found the Ohio motto,
"With God, All Things Are Possible," did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment.74 In Marsh, the Court had re-
jected the Lemon test and turned to both tradition and original intent
justifications to preserve the religious practice.75 The Marsh Court
reasoned that the prayer before the legislative session had historical
importance and exhibited an "unbroken practice," which "is not
something to be lightly cast aside.'
76
Capital Square adopted Marsh's unbroken practice concept to
suggest that government-sponsored oaths, mottoes, or inscriptions
with religious roots have traditionally been found constitutional.77
6 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
67 Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 903.
6' 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
69 Id. at 582.
70 Ie at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
71 See Dreisbach, supra note 6, at 226 ("Given the Supreme Court's extensive and con-
tinuing reliance on general history to inform its church-state pronouncements, historical analysis
has become a prominent feature of church-state jurisprudence and discourse.").
72 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
73 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
74 Capital Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.
75 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791.
76 Id. at 790 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,678 (1970)).
77 See Capital Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (declining to enjoin the use of "With God,
All Things are Possible" as the state motto).
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Citing Lynch v. Donnelly,78 the Court agreed that "[t]here is an un-
broken history of official acknowledgement by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life from at least
1789."79 Capital Square upholds the use of the motto by viewing its
use "in the context of a long tradition of government acknowledgment
of religion., 80 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings,
and reinforced the notion that the traditional treatment of the Estab-
lishment Clause allows for some mixing of government and relig-
ion.81  The Sixth Circuit emphasized traditional governmental in-
volvement with religion from the framing of the Constitution to the
national motto.
82
Tradition played a determinative role in the Capital Square trial
court, just as it has in many other lower courts. In Murray v. City of
Austin,83 the court upheld the placement of a cross on the official seal
of the city.84 The ruling was partially based on the fact that the foun-
der of the city created the seal.85 This "long and unchallenged use"
helped to render the seal constitutional.
86
In Schmidt v. Cline,87 the district court concluded that "a reason-
able observer, aware of the purpose, context, and history of the phrase
'In God We Trust,' would not consider its use.., to be an establish-
ment of religion." 88 Cline is a typical national motto case, in that it
bases a decision on what practices are traditionally not considered to
violate the constitution. 89
The significance of tradition is that regardless of the type of test
the court applies, the court will invariably rely on tradition. Similar
7' 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
79 Id. at 674.
80 Capital Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
s ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 300 (6th Cir. 2001) (not-
ing that the Ohio motto fits "comfortably within this country's long and deeply entrenched
tradition of civic piety ....").
82 See id. at 293-99 (noting religious influences in the works of Madison, Jefferson, and
Lincoln).
" 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
84 Id. at 158 ([T]he insignia passes constitutional muster, whether under Lemon, because
its principal or primary effect is not one that either advances or inhibits religion, or under the
Supreme Court's more recent pronouncements, including Marsh, Lynch, and County of Alle-
gheny.").
85 Id. at 155.
86 ACLU v. City of Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 845, 850 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (discussing the
constitutionality of Murray).
87 127 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Kan. 2000).
88 Id. at 1179 (discussing the national motto through the perspective of a reasonable ob-
server).
89 See id. See also O'Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding constitu-
tionality of 'In God We Trust' national motto); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir.
1970) (holding that national motto and slogan on currency have nothing to do with the estab-
lishment of religion).
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to Marsh, Capital Square rejected the Lemon test.9° However, the
Capital Square court discussed the possible outcome under Lemon
anyway and concluded that "the Ohio motto does not have the pri-
mary ... purpose of advancing religion, and it does not foster exces-
sive entanglement with religion."9' Additionally, the Court relied on
Gaylor v. United States,92 for the proposition that "a long tradition of
government acknowledgement of religion in mottoes, oaths, and an-
thems" satisfies the three-pronged Lemon test.
93
In addition, the Capital Square court evaluated the claim under
O'Connor's Endorsement test.94 Under that test, the Establishment
Clause is violated if there is excessive entanglement of religion and
government, or if the government endorses or disapproves of one re-
ligion.95 The Capital Square court held that the reasonable observer
would not consider the practice an endorsement: "[B]ecause of their
history and ubiquity, those practices are not understood as conveying
government approval of particular religious beliefs. 96 The court in-
voked the unbroken practice justification by relying on the traditional
understanding and interpretation of government sponsored religious
practices.
Another example of the use of tradition in O'Connor's Endorse-
ment test is found in Capital Square Review and Advisory Committee
v. Pinette.97 In Pinette, O'Connor wrote a concurrence, which stated
that the reasonable observer standard invokes a standard that is
"aware of the history and context of the community and forum in
which the religious display appears. 98 This exemplifies the Court's
reliance on history. The Endorsement test implies that if the facts
suggest that a practice contains historical or cultural value known to a
reasonable observer, it may be constitutional.
90 ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1182 (S.D. Ohio
1998) ("This Court concludes that, like Marsh, this case is an exception to [Lemon].").9' Id. at 1182.
92 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996) (dismissing an Establishment Clause challenge to the
national motto).
93 Capital Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
94 Capital Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. ("Ohio's motto passes Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test.").
9s See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from "making an adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community").
96 Capital Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (quoting Lynch, 456 U.S. at 693).
9' 515 US. 753 (1995).
98 Id. at 2455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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B. Why the Court Uses Justifications Rooted in Tradition
The Supreme Court has set forth some reasons for using tradition
and unbroken practice theories, 99 most of which deal with the impor-
tance of tradition. Some commentators have suggested that the Court
has used tradition to establish an aura of objectivity.I°° Drawing on
reasoning from external sources, like history, may help a judicial de-
cision appear more objective.
Additionally, an emphasis on history and tradition serves the
Court's "ideological agenda." 101 For example, a conservative Justice
or Justices may persistently reject civil rights claims, giving "almost
complete deference to governmental institutions," which results in the
government prevailing "while individuals asserting constitutional
rights usually do not prevail."
' 102
An overwhelming number of both Supreme Court and lower
court decisions involve the use of tradition and history.103 Although
there is some validity to the reasoning courts set forth for relying on
tradition, these justifications are not overwhelmingly persuasive,' °4
especially when the theoretical problems associated using tradition
are explored.
C. Problems with the Use of Tradition
There are four clearly identifiable problems with adjudicating on
the basis of tradition or unbroken practice. The first problem is com-
mon to any historical interpretative approach, while the last three
problems are unique to the tradition approach.
The first problem with using history is that it involves a serious
theoretical inconsistency because an "[e]xamination of history only
can tell us what has been; it can never reveal what should be."10' 5 In
other words, the law should be based on rules created within the legal
system, not merely on traditional practices by the Court. The phi-
losophical inconsistency must be set aside for purposes of this discus-
sion.
99 See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) (discussing the role of history and
tradition in Establishment Clause cases).10o Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 908 (discussing why the Court has emphasized history).
101 Dreisbach, supra note 6, at 236 ("That which is passed off as 'history' is less about the
historical record than about advancing a political and ideological agenda.").
102 Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 912.
103 See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
("No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating
history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.").
104 See Dreisbach, supra note 6, at 240 (explaining that "tradition or history... arguments
alone will rarely dispose of church-state controversies definitively or convincingly").
105 Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 918.
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Second, courts rarely draw a distinction between the specific
and general history of the challenged practice. In Marsh, the Court
used specific history because the Court's tradition justification fo-
cused on the history of using chaplains before legislative sessions.
1°6
The Capital Square court relied on a general history of govern-
ment involvement with religion.' °7 The Capital Square court upheld
the Ohio motto by examining the general inter-relationship of gov-
ernment and religion in areas other than mottoes, oaths, anthems and
seals. Under this logic, would every challenged practice not be up-
held?
If the Capital Square court had utilized a more specific unbroken
practice theory such as the one employed by the court in Marsh, it
would have been evident that history did not support an unbroken
practice justification. The motto, "With God, All Things Are Possi-
ble," was adopted in 1959 by the General Assembly of Ohio."0 8 The
motto was brought to the attention of the public in 1996, when the
Governor of Ohio, George Voinovich, recommended that the motto
be engraved in granite above the main entrance to the statehouse
building. Litigation ensued to prevent the engraving of the motto, and
to enjoin the state from using the religious-based phrase as the state
motto.
The forty-two-year history of Ohio's motto pales in comparison
to practices that are deeply rooted in tradition. Therefore, the Capital
Square case differs from Lynch, where a "significant historical reli-
gious event [i.e., Christmas], long celebrated in the Western World"
rendered a nativity scene constitutional. °9 It is also unlike Marsh,
where the practice of opening legislature sessions with a prayer en-
joyed a 200-year history nationally and a 100-year history in Ne-
braska.110 The Ohio motto did not commemorate a historic holiday or
have a long history of use in Ohio. Perhaps if the current motto had
been the original motto adopted by the state of Ohio, the tradition ar-
gument would be more effective."1
The third problem is that the use of tradition allows for too much
subjectivity on the part of judges. The problems associated with sub-
106 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1983) (examining the history of the
specific practice of employing a chaplain to begin legislative sessions with a prayer both in
Nebraska and at the national level).
107 See ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio
1998) (examining the history of the national motto and the writings of Jefferson, Madison and
Lincoln).
'0' Id. at 1177.
109 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984).
110 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
. See Capital Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (discussing Ohio's first motto, "Imperium
in Imperio").
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jectivity is two-fold. First, subjectivity defeats the court's use of tra-
dition as an objective constraint.112 Second, it allows judges to inject
their personal biases into the decision-making process, which threat-
ens the integrity of the judicial system because it raises doubts about
judicial impartiality.
The use of tradition involves a high degree of subjectivity, and
Erwin Chemerinsky points out an obvious example. In Stump v.
Sparkman,11 3 a judge was sued for "imposing involuntary sterilization
on a teenager without any semblance of due process."" 4  The Su-
preme Court held that judges historically had absolute immunity
when the statute in question was enacted. 115 However, "a closer look
at history reveals that judges had absolute immunity in only 13 of the
37 states that existed in 1871. "116
This "selective" reading of history is not unique to Stump v.
Sparkman.117 The problem is that if "history may be manipulated in
any direction, then unrestrained judicial activism is possible."118 A
related concept is "law office history," in which the adversarial attor-
ney "selectively recounts facts, emphasizing data that support the re-
corder's own prepossessions and minimizing significant facts that...
conflict with that bias."'119
In addition, subjectivity defeats one of the purported purposes
for invoking a justification based in tradition. The Court appears to
have a "degree of detachment or objectivity, whereas when history is
not used the Court may be viewed as a committed participant either
for or against religion."'
120
Fourth, the use of tradition is problematic because it leads to in-
consistent and unpredictable outcomes among various courts. For
example, in American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Stow, 121 the
court found that a cross, placed on the city seal, violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. Drawing largely on prior court holdings in govern-
ment seal cases, the Stow court distinguished its facts from those of
Murray v. City of Austin.122 In Murray, the court found no constitu-
112 See discussion supra Part II.
11 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
14 See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 913.
115 Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (citing the general rule that judges in courts of general jurisdic-
tion are not liable for their judicial acts in civil actions, and extending this principle to suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights Acts of 1871).
116 Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 913.
117. See Dreisbach, supra note 6, at 232.
"s Id. at 236-37.
"9 Id. at234.
120 Jonathan K. Van Patten, In the End is the Beginning: An Inquiry into the Meaning of
Religion Clauses, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 6 (1983).
121 29 F. Supp. 2d 845 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
122 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
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tional violation for a cross that was part of the seal. The Murray court
relied exclusively on the idea that the seal was created by Stephen
Austin, the founder of the city.123 This history purported to secularize
the seal, while the history of the Stow seal did not.
Both the Stow court and the Austin court grappled with precisely
the same issue, an official seal that contained a cross. However, the
Austin court upheld the use of the seal on traditional and historical
grounds, while the Stow court found that the cross on the seal violated
the constitution by endorsing one religion. Although these cases are
from different jurisdictions, the Supreme Court decisions permit this
inconsistency by providing scant guidelines to assist judges in consid-
ering history and tradition.
Upon examination of these four problems, it is evident that these
concerns outweigh any purported benefits derived from the use of
tradition.1 24 These problems will remain pervasive as long as lower
courts have no guidelines and are free to use their own interpretation
when using tradition in individual cases.
D. The Fabric of Society Justi fication
The "fabric of society"1 5 justification offers the most elusive use
of history as an adjudicative technique. The phrase suggests that a
government religious practice may be found constitutional if the prac-
tice is so entrenched in the history of the country that it has taken on
social and cultural significance.
The fabric of society approach to history is separate and distinct
from the tradition approach, although the two are related. A practice
or object that is part of the American fabric of society has become
culturally significant. Apple pie and baseball are two easy examples
of things considered part of the American fabric of society. Because
religion and government have co-existed since "at least 1789, ' 26 tra-
ditional and pervasive religious practices may take on a more secular
appearance. Tradition deals with the continuity of a practice, while
the fabric of society reflects the perspective of a participating member
of society. This perspective has been used by courts to justify the
constitutionality of certain religious practices, especially national
motto challenges.
'23 See id. at 152.
124 See discussion supra Part ll.B.
'2 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (stating that government religious prac-
tices that are part of the "fabric of society" may be constitutional).
126 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (explaining the role of religion in Ameri-
can history).
2001]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
In Aronow v. United States,127 the Ninth Circuit rejected a chal-
lenge to the national motto "In God We Trust," holding that "'In God
We Trust' has nothing whatsoever to do with the establishment of
religion."' 28 Other national motto challenges have been dealt with in
similar fashion, for instance, finding that the motto is secularized be-
cause it "symbolizes the historical role of religion in our society, for-
malizes our medium of exchange, fosters patriotism, and expresses
confidence in the future."1 29 The courts agree that the national motto
has become an important symbol for the country, which renders the
challenge almost laughable. The national motto, because of its ubiq-
uity, provides an enlightening example of religious-based practices
that become part of the fabric of society.
Though the Supreme Court has never directly tackled a chal-
lenge to the national motto, there is some Supreme Court dicta on the
subject. 130 The essential point to be gleaned from these discussions is
that "a reasonable observer, aware of the purpose, context, and history
of the phrase ... would not consider its use. . . to be an establishment
of religion." 131 Most courts would probably agree that the national
motto, in light of its history and pervasiveness, has sufficient cultural
importance to pass constitutional muster. However, the fabric of so-
ciety argument has been extended beyond a national motto challenge
analysis.
The Court in Marsh v. Chambers'32 relied almost exclusively on
the fabric of society argument, holding that opening legislative ses-
sions with prayer is not an establishment of religion, but rather a "tol-
erable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of
this country." 133 The Capital Square court used the specific fabric of
society language from Marsh, holding that religious-based "mottoes,
oaths, and anthems" are subject to a historical analysis. 134 Further-
more, because "official mottoes.., which acknowledge the religious
heritage of our nation are also deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country,"' 135 the Ohio motto does not violate the Con-
stitution.
127 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970).
128 Id. at 243.
129 See Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming district
court's dismissal of an Establishment Clause challenge to the national motto).
130 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676 ("Other examples of reference to our religious heritage are
found in the statutorily prescribed national motto 'In God We Trust ... .
131 Schmidt v. Cline, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1179 (D. Kan. 2000).
132 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
33s Id. at 792.
134 ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
135 Id. at 1180.
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The appellate decision in Capital Square further exemplified the
fabric of society justification. The appellate court held that "[t]he
motto is merely a broadly worded expression of a reli-
gious/philosophical sentiment that happens to be widely shared by the
citizens of Ohio."'136 In addition, the court concluded that the "motto
fits comfortably within this country's long and deeply entrenched tra-
dition of civic piety."'13 7 The Sixth Circuit's opinion seemed to rely
almost exclusively on the idea that the Ohio motto is not unconstitu-
tional because it has cultural value, and represents sentiments of
Ohio's citizens more expansive than the merely religious.
In Lynch v. Donnelly,138 the Court again turned to a fabric of so-
ciety rationale. After rejecting the Lemon test,139 the Court upheld a
government-sponsored Christmas nativity display because the prac-
tice was part of the religious "heritage" of the country.
4°
Other lower court decisions have tried to utilize the fabric of so-
ciety logic. In Snyder v. Murray City Corporation,14 1 the court relied
on Marsh and found that 200 years of history rendered prayer before
legislative sessions "tolerable." 142 In United States v. Woodley, 143 the
court upheld the constitutionality of conferring temporary federal ju-
dicial commissions during a recess of the Senate pursuant to Article
II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.144 The court held that "the use
of the recess provision to appoint federal judges has been inextricably
woven into the fabric of our nation."'1
45
The Supreme Court's predominant use of a fabric of society ar-
gument has been to uphold a challenged practice. However, even
when the Court has found a violation of the Establishment Clause, it
has given deference to a fabric of society argument. In County of Al-
legheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,146 the Court found that a
nativity scene, along with religious messages, inside a courthouse
136 ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289,299-300 (6th Cir. 2001).
137 Id. at300.
's 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
139 Id. at 679 ("C[V]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any
single test or criterion in this sensitive area.").
140 Id. at 676, 687 (discussing examples of acceptable practices celebrating our religious
heritage).
4 . 159 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998).
142 Id. at 1232 ("We are obliged, therefore, to read Marsh as establishing the constitutional
principle that the genre of government religious activity that has come down to us over 200
years of history and which we now call 'legislative prayer' does not violate the Establishment
Clause.").
14' 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985).
'44 Id. at 1014.
141 Id. at 1015.
146 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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building violated the Establishment Clause. 147 The Allegheny Court
acknowledged the importance of history and tradition, but found that
the context in which the nativity scene was displayed went beyond
cultural or historical value and into the realm of governmental en-
dorsement of religion. 148 The Court directly confronted the fabric of
society argument by holding that "the government may acknowledge
Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, but under the First Amendment
it may not observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that people
praise God for the birth of Jesus." 149
Allegheny appears to limit the fabric of society standard by stat-
ing "[h]owever history may affect the constitutionality of nonsectar-
ian references to religion by the government, history cannot legiti-
mate practices that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a par-
ticular sect or creed." 150
Thus, the Allegheny Court, and other courts, have criticized the
fabric of society argument.1 51 However, these cases do not suggest
abandoning the approach, but rather hold that the context of the chal-
lenge may overcome the fabric of society argument. This leaves
many courts with the option of using a fabric of society argument,
with all its attendant problems. Before exploring the problems, it is
important to first understand why a court might rely on the fabric of
society justification.
E. Why Courts Have Employed the Fabric of Society Justification
The underlying reasons for employing a fabric of society argu-
ment are similar to the reasons underlying the use of tradition. The
fabric of society justification may act as an objective constraint on
judicial decision-making. Decisions utilizing this argument appear to
reflect the views of society-at-large, not just the views of the trier of
fact. For example, in Schmidt v. Cline,152 the court held that the na-
tional motto "has a secular purpose, symbolizes the historical role of
religion in our society, fosters patriotism, and expresses confidence in
the future."15 3 Here, it is clear that society-at-large was purportedly
enlisted as an objective constraint.
147 Id. at 580 (mentioning that the religious message adorning the nativity scene was "Glo-
ria in Excelsis Deo," or "Glory to God in the Highest").
148 Id. at 601 ("While the county may have doubts about the constitutional status of cele-
brating the Eucharist inside the courthouse under the government's auspices, this Court does
not.").
149 Id. (emphasis added).
ISo Id. at 603.
'"' See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (affirming decision that Alabama laws
violated the Establishment Clause).
152 127 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Kan. 2000).
153 Id. at 1178.
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As with tradition, a fabric of society justification may further the
Court's ideological or political agenda. In Lee v. Weisman,154 the
Court rejected a fabric of society argument made for a school prayer.
However, Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued that the prayer should
be constitutional, because "acknowledgment and support for religion.
. .are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage."'
155
Those familiar with Scalia's view of the Constitution are not sur-
prised to see him advocating a position favorable to a historical un-
derstanding. 156 Yet Scalia invoked a heritage argument, which con-
jures up an association between the religious practice and the cultural
value that the practice has to society.
Fabric of society, as an objective constraint, is fraught with
faulty logic. Furthermore, by using a fabric of society argument, one
runs the risk of allowing an impermissible manipulation of the cul-
tural history of society to advance a particular ideological or political
agenda.
157
F. Problems with Using the Fabric of Society Justification
The "fabric of society" argument has many of the same short-
comings as the unbroken practice justification, and additional prob-
lems that are unique to the argument. It is overly subjective, offen-
sive to some members of society, and produces inconsistent and un-
predictable results.
The most glaring problem is the amount of subjectivity injected
into fabric of society arguments. It is usually the judge who decides
whether a practice has sufficient cultural and historical roots to have
something more than purely religious value.
The Capital Square court held that the Ohio motto was part of
the heritage of the country.15 8 As with the unbroken practice justifica-
tion, the judge made his own decision to refer to the general history of
"mottoes, oaths, and inscriptions" of the country, instead of the spe-
cific history of the Ohio motto. 59 A determination of whether the
Ohio motto specifically was part of the "fabric of our society" might
well have altered the findings of the trial court.
'5 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
155 lId at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156 See Zlotnick, supra note 59, at 1401-03 (discussing Scalia's devotion to a constitutional
understanding based on history, tradition, and the text of the constitution).
157 See Dreisbach, supra note 6, at 236 ("History becomes merely the continuation of poli-
tics by other means:').ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (S.D. Ohio
1998).
159 Id.
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If a court may rely on the general relationship between govern-
ment and religion to suggest that some governmental religious prac-
tices are part of our "political and cultural heritage," 16° the judges are
left with discretion as to the amount of heritage necessary to over-
come the First Amendment.
Furthermore, the fabric of society argument may be inapplicable
to some segments of society, and may even be offensive to certain
groups or individuals. The fabric of society argument suggests that
citizens of the United States, including the litigants to a case, have
shared values and views of society. However, in the demographically
diverse United States, it is hard to imagine that most citizens would
agree on practices that are part of the fabric of society. For example,
a white Christian litigant may accept that a nativity scene is permissi-
ble because it has socio-cultural value, while a Native American liti-
gant might not see anything other than a religious identity to the dis-
play. A minority party will certainly not consider the fabric of society
to be the society of the dominant majority.
Another problem with the use of a fabric of society argument is
the inconsistent and unpredictable results. Due to the amount of sub-
jectivity and the lack of guidelines for applying the theory, lower
courts will undoubtedly produce dramatically different results.
For example, the nativity scene in Lynch v. Donnelly, 161 passed
constitutional muster, while the nativity scene in County of Allegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union 62 did not. The Allegheny Court
distinguished the facts of the case from Lynch, and arrived at the con-
clusion that the context of the religious display mandated that the na-
tivity scene be found unconstitutional. 163 The Allegheny Court simply
stated that, unlike Lynch, "[t]he government may acknowledge
Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, but under the First Amendment
it may not observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that people
praise God for the birth of Jesus."' 164 Allegheny implied that some
religious practices, like those in Lynch, might have enough cultural
value to pass constitutional muster, but gave no guidelines on evaluat-
ing whether a practice was a "cultural phenomenon."
This ambiguity regarding the cultural value of a religious prac-
tice makes it difficult for lower courts to apply the fabric of society
logic on a consistent basis. It results in cases like Capital Square, in
16 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
161 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
162 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601.
163 Id. at 598-601.
164 Id. at601.
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which a religious practice like the Ohio motto is declared culturally
significant, even though it has only a brief and unknown history as
compared to such practices as the national motto, the Pledge of Alle-
giance, and Christmas nativity displays.
The problems associated with using a fabric of society theory do
not justify its continued use as a basis for decision-making. The
amount of subjectivity, the offensive nature of the theory, and incon-
sistent results lead to a conclusion that the theory should be com-
pletely abandoned in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
I1. THE NEXT STEP: KEEPING HISTORY IN CHECK
The next step in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is for the
Court to articulate a standard to be utilized. Furthermore, the Court
must highlight the uses and limitations of history in Establishment
Clause cases.
A. A Workable Standard: The Allegheny Decision
Justice O'Connor's Endorsement test has proven to be the most
workable standard to analyze Establishment Clause issues. The Court
has applied the Endorsement test in several Establishment Clause
cases, including Allegheny.165 In Allegheny, the Endorsement test
included an analysis of the Court's use of history, which confronted
important problems with both tradition and fabric of society justifica-
tions. 16
The Endorsement test was first articulated in a concurring opin-
ion by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly. 67 The Endorsement
test provided that "[g]overnment can run afoul" of the Establishment
Clause in two "principal ways.' 68 The first is whether the govern-
ment has endorsed or disapproved of religion; the second is whether
the government has fostered an excessive government entanglement
with religion. 169 The Endorsement test, in effect, replaced the purpose
prong of Lemon by asking if the government's purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion. 70 Instead of the second Lemon prong, the
effect prong, the Endorsement test asks whether the practice has the
165 See id. at 600 (holding "the county sends an unmistakable message that it supports and
promotes the Christian praise to God that is the [nativity scene's] religious message.").
166 See id. at 601 (evaluating history and fabric of society arguments).
167 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161 Id. at 687.
169 Id. at 688.
17 See James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The En-
dorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 697
(1990) (describing how the Endorsement test modified Lemon).
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effect of endorsing or disapproving of religion. 171 The final Lemon
prong remains intact by asking whether the government has fostered
an excessive entanglement with religion.172
The Endorsement test is a more favorable approach than the
Lemon test it seeks to replace. Lemon was not sensitive enough to the
feelings of minority segments of society.173 It focused on the gov-
ernment action, and as Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted, made it
easy for a court to find a practice had a secular purpose and did not
advance one religion over another. 174 By shifting to an approach that
considers whether an informed observer would regard the practice as
an endorsement of religion, the Court removes the opportunity for the
government to create a pretextual purpose to help satisfy Lemon.
In Allegheny, the Court used the Endorsement test and held a
nativity scene inside a courthouse building violated the Constitu-
tion.' 75 The Allegheny opinion thoroughly considered the context of
the display, noting that "[e]very government practice must be judged
in its unique circumstances to determine whether it endorses relig-
ion.'
176
The freedom for a court to consider the context of a display gives
the Endorsement test flexibility. With a myriad of religious beliefs,
or lack thereof, flexibility is a necessary component of current Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. Allegheny represents an appropriate
application of the Endorsement test, especially in the manner in which
it confronted the use of history.
The Allegheny Court discussed the use of history in Establish-
ment Clause analysis. Without dividing history into subcategories, the
Court dismissed arguments based on tradition and fabric of society.
The Allegheny Court first stumbled upon a fabric of society ar-
gument when dismissing the claim that the nativity scene was accept-
able because it celebrated Christmas as a "national holiday."'177 The
Court attacked this argument head-on by suggesting that if the nativ-
ity scene, alongside other religious symbols, was constitutional be-
cause Christmas is a "cultural phenomenon," then "[i]t would allow
171 Id.
172 Id.
171 Id. at 688.
174 See Langendorfer, supra note 14, at 710 ("Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the
Lemon test be abandoned entirely ....").
175 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
176 Id. at 595 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)).177 Id. at 601.
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the celebration of the Eucharist inside a courthouse on Christmas
Eve."'
178
Allegheny was distinguished from Lynch v. Donnelly,179 because
Lynch reasoned that since because Christmas is part of the fabric of
society, "government may celebrate Christmas in some manner and
form, but not in a way that endorses Christian doctrine."'' ° The Alle-
gheny Court did not accept this fabric of society argument, and im-
plicitly limited the argument to contexts that distinguish between a
cultural celebration of the holiday season and a religious celebration
of Christmas.
Allegheny also dealt with an argument based on tradition or un-
broken practice. The Allegheny Court distinguished Marsh v. Cham-
bers181 by noting that the religious references to Christ were elimi-
nated from the challenged practice, while the context of the nativity
scene specifically referred to Christ.182 Thus Allegheny stands for the
proposition that a long, unbroken history of a practice will not render
that practice per se constitutional. 83 The Court may consider the tra-
dition of a practice, but the essential question still remains whether
"the practice demonstrates the government's support, promotion, or
'endorsement' of the particular creed....,184
The Allegheny decision applied the Endorsement test. In addi-
tion, the Court introduced the tradition and fabric of society analyses
into the framework, and found that while the history can be consid-
ered, it can never be determinative.
B. Keeping History in Check
History will always be used as a principle of adjudication. Yet
the approaches to using history can be separated, individually ana-
lyzed, and applied in a specific and restrained manner. Some ap-
proaches have been thoroughly analyzed and tested over the years,
and may be applied with appropriate guidelines. These include
precedent and original intent. Tradition and fabric of society argu-
ments have not been similarly resolved, and require fine-tuning in
order to use in Establishment Clause adjudication.
With some limitations and guidelines, tradition may be consid-
ered in an Establishment Clause analysis. First of all, tradition can
178 Itd
179 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
180 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601.
s 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
112 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 (holding that Marsh does not "compel" the Allegheny Court
to find the nativity scene constitutional).
183 See id
'8 Id. at 608.
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never justify a challenged practice by itself. It must always be used in
conjunction with other principles of adjudication such as precedent
and policy considerations. Some courts have advanced this limita-
tion.
For example, in Marsh v. Chambers,185 the Court held that
"[s]tanding alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary vio-
lations of constitutional guarantees.' 186 The Marsh Court used the
tradition justification in conjunction with an original understanding
justification to uphold the practice of beginning Nebraska state legis-
lative sessions with prayer. As Allegheny pointed out, it was not
merely the tradition of prayer before legislative sessions, but the fact
that the prayers were stripped of all references to Christ. 87 In Alle-
gheny, the Court found the direct references to Christ in the context of
the cr~che display rendered it unconstitutional.1 88  The Allegheny
Court effectively utilized the Marsh limitation by showing that tradi-
tion alone cannot justify governmental endorsement of religion.
The Marsh limitation is a useful constraint on unbridled argu-
ments rooted in tradition, but the limitation is often not given enough
weight. In Capital Square, the court cited the Marsh limitation.'89
However, the nature of the challenge in Capital Square was far dif-
ferent than the challenge in Marsh. Prayer before legislative sessions
has significant historical roots, dating back to the First Congress,19°
which supported an original intent justification. The Capital Square
court attempted to extract an original intent argument out of the Ohio
motto. The court compared the use of the motto to historic practices
such as judicial oaths, 9'celebrating Thanksgiving, 192 and continuing
use of the Pledge of Allegiance and national motto.193 These com-
parisons stretch the Marsh limitation because the original intent ar-
gument, used in conjunction with tradition, are based on practices not
directly related to the Ohio motto.
'85 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
186 Id. at 790.
187 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603-04 (distinguishing Marsh).
88 Id. at 601-02 (stating that the County "has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a way that
has the effect of endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus
Christ").
189 See ACLU v. Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (S.D.
Ohio 1998).
'90 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (discussing the history of prayer before legislative ses-
sions).
191 Capital Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 ("Every justice or judge of the United States is
required by law to take an oath to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of the office 'So
help me God."').
192 Id. at 1181 ("Almost all presidents since Washington have issued thanksgiving procla-
mations specifically invoking the deity.").
193 Id. ("The Court has never suggested that the national motto or the Pledge of Allegiance
are unconstitutional.").
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The next limitation on the use of tradition comes in the form of a
balancing test. A court must examine the specificity of the tradition.
The more specific the history is, the more it supports the argument
that the challenged practice is acceptable. Specificity in comparisons
safeguards against courts using general theories of religion and gov-
ernment mingling to justify specific governmental sponsored religious
practices. Under Marsh, the 200 years of specific tradition of prayer
before legislative sessions would be sufficient, while the forty-two
years of the Ohio motto tradition in Capital Square would be consid-
ered suspect.
A court may never use only tradition to justify a decision. Fur-
thermore, the tradition used must be the specific tradition and history
of the practice, not merely a reference to a general history of govern-
ment involvement in religion. With these limitations in mind, the
court may consider an argument based partially on tradition.
The fabric of society justification is not as salvageable as tradi-
tion. The inherent subjectivity and offensiveness 194 involved with the
fabric of society theory demands that courts abandon it completely as
a basis for decision-making.
However, if a court chooses to use such a justification, the most
important check for such use will be to simply identify the justifica-
tion used. The fabric of society argument deals with subtleties of
human decision making, such as values, perspectives, and personal
preferences. If the fabric of society justification is invoked, the court
must fully explicate its reliance on the theory. If ideas of cultural
heritage are bandied about, the court must expressly state to which
culture it is referring, and acknowledge the fact that not all citizens of
a country may adopt the same societal values and perspectives.
The Allegheny Court recognized the use of a fabric of society
argument, and quickly dismissed it by suggesting that some practices
go beyond the celebration of a national holiday and into the realm of a
purely religious celebration. 19 The Court correctly identified the ar-
gument, and correctly dismissed it.
CONCLUSION
The Endorsement test provides the best framework to analyze
Establishment Clause issues. The Allegheny decision exemplifies an
application of the test, including an analysis of specific historically
based arguments.
194 See discussion supra Part II.B.
195 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) ("The government may ac-
knowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, but under the First Amendment it may not
observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus.").
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It is unrealistic to think the Court will treat use Allegheny to
evaluate every Establishment Clause case or, alternatively, cease us-
ing history as a basis for adjudication. However, as the use of history
can be divided into different approaches, courts may begin to assess
the benefits and drawbacks of using each historical approach. With a
firm grasp on the influence of history on judicial decision-making, the
subjectivity, inconsistency, intellectual dishonesty, and advancement
of political and ideological agendas can be held in check.
If Capital Square had identified and limited it use of history, the
outcome may have been different. After all, history alone cannot pos-
sibly render all things secular.
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